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PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN K. WASHBURN 
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL 
 
ON 
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY  
BEFORE THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 
THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2007 
 
Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee again.   
 
It seems disingenuous to describe law enforcement and public safety in Indian Country as an 
urgent crisis because it has been a serious problem not just for years, but for decades.  I 
know that this Committee understands the importance of  this issue and I applaud you for 
taking up the issue today and providing an important forum for discussion and, hopefully, 
for action.   
 
Some facts related to Indian country are muddy, but this one is clear: the models of  criminal 
justice that are responsible for poor public safety in Indian country have emasculated tribal 
governmental systems and made state and the federal officials the primary providers of  
public safety in Indian country.  State, county and federal governments have competing 
priorities that distract them from the importance of  public safety on Indian reservations.  
Tribal governments are the only governments that are singularly concerned about the quality 
of  life on reservations.  Until tribal governments are restored to a central role and made 
primarily responsible for assuring safety on Indian reservations, we are likely to see 
continued problems.  Redressing the serious public safety problems on Indian reservations 
will not be fully successful until the entire system is reconfigured to give tribal governments 
primacy over reservation communities.  Both tribal self-governance and public safety are 
better served when tribes exercise a central role in providing public safety and 
criminal justice on Indian reservations. 
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Restoring the law enforcement powers of  tribal government is a difficult political challenge.  
Not only are state and the federal officials likely to object to transferring power to tribes, but 
tribal leaders are unlikely to come to you to clamor for more authority.  It may not be fruitful 
politically for a tribal leader to say to Congress, “I would like to have greater power to lock 
up my own people.”  Moreover, since public safety is perhaps the most dire social problem 
on American Indian reservations, tribal leaders may not have adequate resources to address 
the issue successfully.  In such circumstances, a tribal leader may think it irresponsible -- and 
see no advantage politically -- in buying into almost certain failure.  Moreover, it is politically 
expedient for tribal leaders to have someone else to share the blame.  States and the federal 
government seem to be willing villains.  Other than an occasional embarrassing report, 
federal and state officials have little political accountability for the failure of  public safety on 
Indian reservations.  Thus, though public safety can improve only through greater tribal 
involvement, we should not expect to see tribal leaders clamoring for greater public safety 
authority.   
 
Though we must put tribal governments out front in addressing public safety, it will not be 
an easy task.  We cannot restore tribes greater authority without also helping them obtain the 
necessary resources to do the job.  Because I recognize significant political obstacles to wide-
ranging restoration of  tribal authority, I would like to focus now on partial solutions or 
measures that might help improve tribal safety that are nevertheless short of  wholesale 
restoration of  tribal authority on Indian reservations.  One of  the best resources tribal 
governments can have is cooperation.  It is to this resource I will now turn. 
 
Partial Solutions/Improvements 
 
If  I leave you with one concrete idea here today, it should be the notion that cooperation 
among existing law enforcement agencies across all orders of  government is crucial in 
dealing with violent crime in Indian country.  Criminal offenders do not respect jurisdictional 
boundaries.   Thus, any reform proposal ought to attempt to foster cooperation among law 
enforcement agencies.   
 
To illustrate my point, I ask you to indulge me a brief  anecdote.  In 1998, when I was 
serving as an Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting violent crimes in Indian country 
in New Mexico, I had a chance encounter with Rudolph Giuliani who was then serving his 
second term as Mayor of  New York City.  Giuliani had presided over a long and steady 
period of  decline in crime in New York, both as Mayor and, before that, as United States 
Attorney, and he was basking in that success.   
 
In light of  the fact that violent crime in Indian country had been increasing steadily 
throughout the 1990s at the same time that it had been decreasing throughout most of  the 
rest of  the country, I asked Giuliani what strategies we might use in Indian country to 
achieve the successes that New York had achieved in reducing violent crime.   
 
Giuliani pondered the question for a moment.  He noted that as Mayor of  New York City, 
he had full control over law enforcement through all five boroughs, covering several million 
citizens. Combining computer technology and improved crime reporting, his Comp-Stat 
system could monitor the development of  crime on a nearly instantaneous basis and with 
such focus that it could detect crime problems on a block-by-block basis.  This information 
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allowed New York City to deploy police officers swiftly and efficiently to neighborhoods 
desperately in need of  attention and to move those resources again on the very next shift.  
He made the New York City Police Department a model of  responsiveness and 
coordination. 
 
When I asked Giuliani to bring that experience to bear on Indian country, he correctly 
realized that such coordination was nearly impossible across such vast expanses of  land in 
Indian country jurisdictions, where no one law enforcement agency has unilateral authority 
and where police officers are spread very thin.  Under such circumstances, such coordination 
simply could not be achieved in the way that it could under the Comp-Stat system and with a 
single chain of  command.  He basically said, “you have a terrific problem ahead of  you, kid,” 
and wished me luck. 
 
Giuliani’s astute insight about the importance of  coordination in public safety came to mind 
again a couple of  years later in the aftermath of  the World Trade Center disaster.  On 9/11, 
when fire and rescue personnel could not communicate with one another in the crucial 
minutes before the towers fell, many lives were lost.  In one tragic event, it became clear that 
the tremendous coordination that Mayor Giuliani had achieved in law enforcement had 
utterly eluded him in another key area of  public safety.  It was an important lesson for him, I 
am sure, and it is an important lesson for all of  us. 
 
Because law enforcement authority in Indian country is spread across wide expanses of  land 
and many orders of  government (federal, state, tribal, county, and municipal), we will never 
be able to achieve the level of  coordination that Mayor Giuliani’s police department achieved 
in New York City.  Indeed, our federal system is designed to spread out such authority 
among different orders of  government.  Given limited resources and crisis conditions, 
however, we must strive to avoid the lack of  coordination that plagued the World Trade 
Center disaster.  We must recognize that no single law enforcement agency can address crime 
alone.  Thus, we must work to facilitate cooperation among them. 
 
* * * 
 
One lesson is that law enforcement can be effective in achieving public safety only if  there is 
adequate cooperation between the key actors.  I offer the following observations.   
 
I. Most of  the law enforcement successes in Indian country have come from 
careful and effective cooperation between law enforcement authorities.   
 
Law enforcement works best when neither the offender, nor the law-abiding citizen, can 
detect any gaps in coverage.  When a potential offender scans the landscape and considers 
whether to break the law, he must see a unified front among law enforcement officials.  To 
put it another way, the thin blue line that protects the ordinary citizen from the criminal 
element cannot be effective if  it is a dotted line.   
 
Most citizens in the United States do not care strongly who responds to public safety crises, 
they just want to know that when they dial 911, they will get the help that they need.  It is the 
job of  government to ensure that kind of  confidence.  Especially in the many rural districts 
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that include Indian country, effective law enforcement can be achieved only with close 
cooperation between governments.   
 
The good news is that cooperation between law enforcement agencies is occurring widely in 
Indian country.  This Committee has heard ample testimony of  such cooperation, 
particularly in the methamphetamine context, including tremendous successes at Wind River 
in Wyoming and with my own tribe, the Chickasaw Nation, in Oklahoma.  As tribal 
organizations build capacity, they are working more and more with their state and federal 
counterparts. 
 
In most of  the states that have federally-recognized Indian tribes, tribal governments have 
entered agreements with states and/or counties that facilitate cooperation.  Many states and 
the federal government, of  course, also provide mechanisms for state-wide recognition of  
tribal police as law enforcement officers.  In other states, these agreements are struck at the 
local level.  These agreements span a range of  law enforcement activities, reflecting mutual 
aid efforts, cross-deputization or cross-commission agreements, extradition, and other 
cooperative action arrangements.  They also sometimes address thorny issues such as liability 
and sovereign immunity.  And in addition to normal law enforcement activity, the 
agreements also sometimes cover the sharing of  information between agencies, such as prior 
arrests, traffic records, and other criminal history. 
 
Effective cooperative agreements have the ability to simplify complex questions, freeing law 
enforcement officers to focus on the most important aspects of  their jobs.  The Committee 
is well aware of  the jurisdictional complexities of  Indian country, and I will not belabor 
them here, but police officers tend to be well-trained in the police sciences, not in ethnology 
or land surveying.  Cooperative agreements tend to allow police officers to focus on public 
safety and not on highly artificial and arcane legal issues, such as jurisdictional boundary 
lines. 
 
Still, though cooperation is occurring widely, it is not universal by any means.  In many 
jurisdictions, cooperation is not formalized. 
 
II. Even informal or de facto cooperation between law enforcement agencies can 
help produce law-abiding behavior and thus serve public safety.    
 
Even in the absence of  formal agreements, the appearance of  cooperation and coordination 
between police officers can help to create an effective public safety net.  One of  my 
colleagues, a law professor who is a non-Indian, recently illustrated this point well.  While 
working on the Navajo Reservation, she was stopped for driving in excess of  the speed limit 
on a lonely reservation highway.  When she mentioned that she was non-Indian and that the 
tribe might not have jurisdiction, the tribal officer apparently offered to let her wait for a 
state trooper and have her case adjudicated in the state system, with the attendant delay and 
other ramifications that such action would entail.1  Under such circumstances, the mere 
threat of  cooperation between law enforcement officials led the professor to see that 
objecting to tribal authority would waste her time, would likely not be fruitful, and might 
                                                          
1 Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1047, 1048-49 & n. 7 (2005). 
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subject her to more severe traffic penalties.  She accepted the citation and opted for the 
tribal process.   
 
One could easily imagine the same scenario involving a state trooper and American Indian 
violators.  Thus, even informal cooperation, or the appearance of  it, can help to assure 
offenders and non-offenders alike that there is no prosecution-free zone in Indian country.   
 
Whether it occurs formally or informally, cooperation often is the norm in Indian country.  
Cops tend to be able to work with other cops, especially at the street level, primarily because 
they share a common enemy and they realize that the enemy is not other law enforcement 
agents.   
 
III. While cooperation and trust between law enforcement agencies can improve 
public safety, conflict and lack of  cooperation among such agencies can only 
undermine public safety.   
 
Street level police officers may have friendly rivalries with those from other agencies, but 
they often work well together when responding to a crime or undertaking an investigation.  
They know that crime control and public safety can be achieved far more successfully when 
law enforcement agencies work together.  Sometimes, however, agencies fail to cooperate.  
When this happens, public safety suffers. 
 
Some recent events in my own state of  Minnesota illustrate the potential for trouble when 
law enforcement agencies fail to work together.  The Mille Lacs Band of  Ojibwe Indians 
exercises some law enforcement functions on its reservation.  It also cooperates closely with 
state and county officials who have law enforcement authority under a 1953 Congressional 
statute called Public Law 280.  In circumstances in which county and tribal law enforcement 
share authority within the same geographic space, cooperation is key.  Indeed, Mille Lacs 
County and the Mille Lacs Band entered into an agreement in 1998 that provides that each 
agency shall provide mutual assistance to the other.  The 1998 agreement also addresses 
other important issues, such as how prosecutions will be commenced and how liability for 
law enforcement torts will be allocated and waives tribal immunity for such actions against 
the tribe to be tried in the same manner as for municipalities within the state.    
 
As a result of  the agreement, tribal police officers have routinely referred criminal activities 
to the County Attorney for state prosecution.  Since the Band employs 19 tribal police 
officers who are certified law officers under state law, the Band is a significant partner in 
providing public safety on the reservation.  The Band spends approximately $2 million a year 
on law enforcement activities and provides a significant law enforcement presence in that 
part of  the County.   
 
Recently, however, the relationship between the County and the Band has deteriorated.  The 
Mille Lacs County Attorney, who is responsible for prosecuting the offenses that arise in 
Mille Lacs County, has challenged the very existence of  the Mille Lacs Reservation itself, 
arguing that it was disestablished in the early 1900s.  In a memo to county employees last 
year, she ordered all employees to stop referring to Indian land as “reservation” land.  This 
assertion, which conflicts with the County’s own agreement with the tribe, caused an 
unnecessary rift between the County and the Band.  Apparently emboldened by the County 
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Attorney’s actions, some of  the worst prejudices of  some members of  one of  the local 
communities were on display at a summer parade after news of  the memo circulated.  On 
that day, citizens lining the parade route booed and made obscene gestures toward a float 
carrying elderly American Indian war veterans.   
 
To a criminal law professor, those boos sound an awful lot like the fabric of  the community 
tearing under the enormous weight of  prejudice.  While booing elderly Indian veterans may 
be protected speech under the First Amendment, it suggests trouble ahead to anyone 
concerned about public safety.  Imagine the public safety concerns that arise when a crowd 
of  people feel emboldened to express animus in a way that violates our fundamental social 
norms of  respect for the elderly and honor for our nation’s war veterans.  Will such people 
commit acts of  violence?  If  police are called out, will these prejudiced people respect state-
certified tribal police officers who are engaged in the routine work of  law enforcement in 
keeping peace?   
 
It is the job of  law enforcement officers to build cooperation, not destroy it.  Thus, the 
failure of  the county attorney to work toward trust and cooperation may have long term 
ramifications.  This past spring, another occurrence from the same locale stoked great 
mistrust of  the County Attorney by tribal members.  In the course of  attempting to bring a 
prosecution for a minor offense, the County arrested a child victim of  an assault, only 11 
years old, who was jailed overnight, and required to appear in court the next day in an 
orange jail jumpsuit.  The incident drew howls of  protest in the tribal community.  The tribe 
felt that the arrest of  the child victim had the effect of  victimizing the child a second time.  
As a result, the County Attorney has largely lost the confidence of  a large number of  the 
people that she is intended to serve.   These events raise an important question: what 
happens when cooperation fails and law enforcement loses the trust of  the community it has 
been given the responsibility to serve? 
 
IV. Cooperation must be encouraged at every step of  the process.  When it fails, 
tribal communities must have alternative options. 
 
Congress must work to provide incentives for cooperation among state, federal and tribal 
law enforcement agencies.    
 
As the previous discussion indicates, however, cooperation may fall short even when strong 
incentives already exist.  Through cooperation, the Mille Lacs County Attorney has 19 
additional tribal police officers at her disposal to maintain public safety and respond to 
crimes.  This is a tremendous incentive to cooperate.  Yet, the County Attorney seems to 
have worked to undermine that cooperation and made it difficult for tribal law enforcement 
officials to work with the County.   
 
In circumstances where positive incentives toward cooperation fail, Congress should create 
an alternative approach, an escape valve, if  you will, for tribes.  In Public Law 280 states, for 
example, Congress should give tribes the full ability to opt out of  state Public Law 280 
jurisdiction in circumstances in which the tribes have lost confidence in the state officials 
responsible for public safety.  While tribes now have a limited retrocession option, existing 
law requires states to consent to the exercise of  such an option.  Giving the state the right to 
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veto a retrocession is ill-advised because it prevents the tribe from going elsewhere if  the 
state is not doing its job.  The state ought to have incentive to serve the tribe well.   
 
A tribal option for retrocession, that is, a choice, would further tribal self-government by 
putting key law enforcement questions in the hands of  the tribe and force the state to be 
responsive to the tribe if  it wishes to keep the tribe as a partner.  It would also further public 
safety because it would make the government accountable to the community it is supposed 
to be serving.  If  a reservation community believes that the state is doing a good job, then 
the state can continue.  But if  the state is doing a poor job, then it can install a federal/tribal 
system in which tribal officials will be forced to exercise greater accountability for public 
safety.   
 
To address public safety, Congress should encourage the more robust exercise of  existing 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses by American Indians.  Tribal 
governments are better situated and more responsive to reservation communities.  They are 
thus likely to do a better job in addressing public safety than any federal or state officials can.   
 
For a limited category of  offenses, Congress should consider, perhaps on a pilot basis, giving 
those responsible tribes that are interested in participating a modicum of  misdemeanor 
criminal authority over non-Indians who commit crimes involving Indians on the 
reservation.  With appropriate safeguards, such jurisdiction could resolve many of  the 
continuing problems in Indian country by placing control over law enforcement and criminal 
justice with the government that is best situated – and best motivated – to address violent 
crimes and minor narcotics offenses.  Accepting the exercise of  limited criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians by tribal governments is a very modest step toward addressing a public 
safety problem that has existed for far too long. 
 
* * * 
 
A final word.  Modern federal policymakers have long been interested in furthering tribal 
self-government because tribal governments are better at providing services to tribal 
communities.  If  we wish to promote public safety, it is hard to imagine a better way to do 
that than by empowering the government that is most interested in providing it.  No 
government has a greater interest in reservation safety than the government that calls the 
reservation home.  Only the tribal government is fully accountable to the reservation 
community that must live without public safety. 
 
Likewise, it is hard to imagine a subject more crucial to tribal self-government than public 
safety.  A community cannot effectively exercise self-government when it cannot establish an 
environment in which citizens can safely and vigorously engage in the activities of  
governance.  Effective tribal law enforcement is a key ingredient to reservation public safety.   
 
Scholars can quibble about whether tribal courts should be able to try non-Indians, or 
whether state or federal courts are fair or effective, but unless we have adequate law 
enforcement in place, all this quibbling is no more useful than re-arranging office chairs in 
the World Trade Center on September 10, 2001.  We do not need agreement on all 
jurisdictional issues to create public safety in Indian country, but we do need cooperation 
among those players whose task is to ensure public safety.  Those agencies that do not 
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cooperate ought to be strongly encouraged to do so.  If  they fail to improve, they should 
step aside in favor of  governments that are more interested in providing public safety.   
 
Thank you for asking me to appear here today.   
 
Disclaimer: The comments expressed herein are solely those of  the author as an individual 
member of  the academic community; the author does not represent the University of  
Minnesota for purposes of  this testimony.  
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